

# Canadian Economic Theory Conference 2026 Program and Timetable

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May 8–10, 2026

Vancouver School of Economics,  
UBC

Room #533

Iona Building, 6000 Iona Drive,  
Vancouver

## Program

### Session 1: Friday May 8, 9:00-10:30

**Hoxha (Stanford)\***. Targeted Advertising Platforms: Data Sharing and Customer Poaching

**Murphy (Upenn)\***. Clicks or Comments? The quality-quantity trade-off of review systems.

**Liang, Lu(UCLA)\***. Creative Ownership in the Age of AI

### Session 2: Friday 10:50-12:20

**Peski (University of Toronto)\*, Stewart**. Non-distortionary elicitation of beliefs in dynamic problems

**Dutta (McGill)\*, Masatlioglu, Mu**. Binary choice paths and random utility

**Curello, Quah (NUS)\*, Strulovici**. Voting over time and space

### Session 3: Friday 14:00-15:30

**Zhang, Zhou (Columbia)\***. Knowledge-Based Mechanisms

**Feng (Columbia)\*, Liu**. Self-Confirming Mechanisms

**Kunimoto (Singapore Management University)\*, Saran, Serrano.** Rationalizable Incentives: Interim Rationalizable Implementation of Correspondences

#### **Session 4: Friday, 15:50-17:20**

**Rahman (University of Minnesota)\*.** Duality and Recursion in Dynamic Games

**Gori (Toulouse)\*, Khounsari.** Indexability in locally correlated search and applications

**Xiong (UC Riverside)\*.** Börgers's Open Question Resolved

#### **Session 5: Saturday May 9, 9:00-10:30**

**Csóka, Liu, Rodivilov (Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute)\*, Teytelboym.** Efficiency and Collusion-Proofness in Dynamic Mechanism Design

**Brandl, Shi (University of Toronto)\*.** Sequential Sampling under Adversarial Manipulation

**Fuchs, Gral, Moreira (FGV EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance)\*.** Repeated Trade with Divisible Goods

#### **Session 6: Saturday 10:50-12:20**

**Yang (UCL)\*, Dai, Wang.** The Fragile Promise: Job Security and Contract Design

**Fahim, Gervais, Krishna (Florida State)\*.** Monitoring in Dynamic Financial Contracts

**Basak (Indiana)\*, Choudhary, Zhou.** Frequent Stress Tests

#### **Session 7: Saturday 14:00-15:30**

**Han(McMaster)\*, Xiong.** Contracting with Imperfect Commitment

**Ozyurt (York University)\*, Zeng.** Peaceful Dispute Resolution with an Imperfectly Informed Mediator

**Watson (UCSD)\*, Miller.** Coalitions and Recurrent Negotiation in Multilateral Relational Contracts

#### **Session 8: Saturday 15:50-17:20**

**Antic (Northwestern)\*, Pei.** Selective Disclosure in Overlapping Generations

**Orzach (Boston University)\*.** Self-Censorship of Hard Information

**Li (Concordia)\*, Yang, Pu.** The Design of Quality Disclosure Policy and the Limits

## Conference Dinner: Saturday 18:30-

### Session 9: Sunday May 10, 9:00-10:30

**Han, Sam (University of Calgary)\***. Information Design from Endogenous Private Signals

**Habermacher (Universidad de los Andes)\*, Foerster**. Authority, communication, and internal markets

**Arieli (University of Toronto)\*, Stewart**. Bayesian Persuasion without Commitment

### Session 10: Sunday, 10:50-12:20

**Fabrizi (UC Berkeley)\***. Attention Holdup

**Awarya (University of Tokyo)\*, Krishna**. Social Learning with Correlated Information

**Lee (Washington St. Louis)\*, Echenique, Goel**. Swap Bounded Envy

## Conference Timetable

### Friday, May 8

Time	Event
9:00–10:30	Session 1
10:30–10:50	Coffee Break
10:50–12:20	Session 2
12:20–14:00	Lunch
14:00–15:30	Session 3
15:30–15:50	Break
15:50–17:20	Session 4

## **Saturday, May 9**

Time	Event
9:00–10:30	Session 5
10:30–10:50	Coffee Break
10:50–12:20	Session 6
12:20–14:00	Lunch
14:00–15:30	Session 7
15:30–15:50	Break
15:50–17:20	Session 8
18:30–	Conference Dinner

## **Sunday, May 10**

Time	Event
9:00–10:30	Session 9
10:30–10:50	Break
10:50–12:20	Session 10